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Abstract
Social and interregional inequality patterns across US states from 1929-2012
are analyzed using exploratory space-time methods. The results suggest
complex spatial dynamics for both inequality series that were not captured
by the stylized model of Alonso (1980). Interpersonal income inequalities of
states displayed a U-shaped pattern ending the period at levels that exceeded
the alarmingly high patterns that existed in the 1920s. Social inequality
is characterized by greater mobility than that found for state per capita
incomes. Spatial dependence is also distinct between the two series, with
per capita incomes exhibiting strong global spatial autocorrelation, while
state interpersonal income inequality does not. Local hot and cold spots are
found for the per capita income series, while local spatial outliers are found
for state interpersonal inequality. Mobility in both inequality series is found
to be influenced by the local spatial context of a state.
1 Introduction
Through a synthesis of previous research on regional economic development,
Alonso (1980) provided a stylized model of how to explore the relationships
between the dynamics of five di↵erent aspects of economic development:
[1] economic growth; [2] social inequality; [3] regional inequality; [4] geo-
graphical concentration of population; and [5] demographic transition. The
bell analogy relates to the so-called inverted U pattern, posited by Kuznets
(1955) for social, or personal income, inequality, and Williamson (1965) for
regional inequality, in that the shape of the bell portrays the expected evolu-
tion of each type of inequality as an economic system develops. Alonso also
suggested the bell-shaped curve gave good approximation to the evolution
of the three other phenomena.
While immensely important for regional scientists, these bells leave the
geographic dimensions of these dynamics largely untouched. These trajec-
tories do tell us something about the dynamics of some overall, whole map,
statistic, but they are silent on the spatial footprint of those dynamics. Al-
though Alonso also argued that two of these phenomena, regional inequality
and geographical concentration, were spatial in nature his definition of spa-
tial is a limited one in that for both attributes the concentration, or inequal-
ity, is actually a summary measure of the values of those attributes and is
invariant to the spatial distribution of the underlying phenomena across the
units (i.e., states, counties, regions).
In this paper I revisit two of these five bells to consider the spatial
dynamics of regional income inequality and interpersonal income inequal-
ity. Drawing on recently developed methods of exploratory space-time data
analysis I first examine each series individually followed by a comparative
analysis. Specific attention is given to the rate of mobility, or spatial change,
in the inequality measure over time. Discrete Markov chains and their spatial
extensions are applied to series for the US states over the period 1929-2012.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I first discuss the
motivation for focusing on a joint treatment of regional and interpersonal
income inequality in Section 2. This is followed by a description of the data
series and particular spatial analytics of the research design in Section 3. In
Section 4 the results of the analysis are examined, and the paper concludes
with an overview of the key findings and directions for future research.
2
2 Interpersonal and Interregional Income Inequal-
ity
This paper focuses on, and contrasts, patterns of two types of inequality,
interpersonal and interregional, or what Alonso referred to as social and
regional inequality, respectively. Both types of inequality have attracted
enormous attention in large literatures.1 However, these two literatures are
largely independent. Alonso’s reasoning some 35 years ago suggested that
the two inequality series should be tied together. One of the main goals of
this paper is to reconsider the two forms of inequality in tandem using the
US experience as the empirical setting.
2.1 Interpersonal Inequality
In the US, the 1970s marked the end of a long period of declining income
inequality that began during the 1940s. Initially the reversal was gradual,
but beginning in the 1980s the increase in inequality accelerated. The nature
of this shift has been rather dramatic and, unsurprisingly, has attracted
much attention from both academics and policy makers (Galbraith, 2012;
Noah, 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2006). Piketty and Saez
(2013) note that one consequence of this rise in interpersonal US income
inequality has been that the share of income going to individuals in the top
percentile of the income distribution has more than doubled from just under
10 percent in the 1970s to over 20 percent in 2010. At the same time, more
than 15 percent of US national income has shifted from individuals in the
bottom 90 percent to those in the top decile of the distribution. The shift
itself has also been particularly concentrated within the top decile, as more
than 60 percent of US aggregate income growth between 1976 and 2007 has
been absorbed by the top 1 percent of the distribution (Piketty and Saez,
2013, p. 458).
The use of metaphors to describe temporal patterns of aggregate inter-
personal inequality continues in the modern literature as reflected in the
arguments of Piketty and Saez (2006, p. 201) who note that:
The overall pattern of the top decile share of the century is U-
shaped.
1For overviews of the regional inequality literature see Rey and Janikas (2005), and
for a survey of personal income inequality see Piketty and Saez (2013); Smeeding and
Thompson (2011).
3
Of course they go on to note that this is not an inverted-U, and thus
their finding is at odds with the stylized arguments of Kuznets (1955), and,
I would add, Alonso.
A number of arguments have been put forth regarding the forces behind
these personal income inequality dynamics in the US. Increasing interna-
tional trade in the form of import competition over the past several decades
has been linked to inequality, yet the estimates of trade’s contribution to
rising inequality has varied from highs of 50 percent (Wood, 1994), to lower
shares of 20 (Leamer, 1994) to 10 percent (Krugman and Lawrence, 1993),
with some studies finding no significant linkage between trade and inequality
(Sachs et al., 1994). However, results in Rigby and Breau (2008) challenge
the findings that trade has little impact on rising inequality, as their exam-
ination of the relationship at a finer sub-national spatial scale revealed a
positive association between the growth of trade and wage inequality.
The impact of skill-biased technical change (SBTC) has been argued
by some to be a significant factor being rising inequality. By increasing
the demand for more highly educated labor, SBTC is said to put upward
pressure on their wages and, conversely, downward pressure on the wages of
less educated workers leading to a widening of wage inequality. Estimates of
SBTC’s contribution to rising inequality are on the order of 25-40 percent
(Breau, 2007). In contrast Card and DiNardo (2002) suggest that SBTC is
not a significant source of wage inequality increases in the US.2
In addition to trade and technological changes, a number of institutional
sources of raising US income inequality have been put forth. Changes in the
US tax system through the 1981 Economic Recovery and Taxation Act and
the Tax Reform act of 1986 have resulted in increased regressivity of per-
sonal income taxes (Levy and Murnane, 1992, p. 1346). Similarly, corporate
income taxes have declined from a high of 39.8 percent in the 1940’s to 9.9
percent in 2012 (Stiglitz, 2014, p. 9) the benefits of which have dispropor-
tionately accrued to high income individuals.
Alongside changes in tax policies, Kristal (2013) argues that the decline
in unionization, from a high of 24% in 1945 to under 8% by 2012, caused a
decline in labor’s share of national income resulting in increased inequality.
Gordon (2014) estimates that declining unionization accounted for about a
third of the increase in inequality in the 1980s and 1990s. Card and DiNardo
(2002) point to a fall in the real value of the minimum wage in the US over
2It should be kept in mind that trade and technological change are not necessarily
orthogonal so attempts at decomposing inequality rises to constituent forces should be
viewed with caution.
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the 1970-2000 period as explaining some 90% of the variation in the gap
between the 90 and 10% wage percentiles.
These arguments concern the evolution of aggregate interpersonal in-
equality at the national level. There has been a smaller related research
thread examining patterns at the subnational scale.3 A number of stud-
ies have focused on the variation in interpersonal income inequality across
regional economies in the US (Levernier et al., 1995; Partridge, 1997; Par-
tridge et al., 1998; Panizza, 2002; Partridge, 2005; Frank, 2009). Changes
in inequality at the subnational level have been associated with changes
in demographic variables, such as immigration (Chakravorty, 1996; Nielsen
and Alderson, 1997), household and gender composition (Madden, 2000;
Essletzbichler, 2015), as well as industrial economic restructuring (Odland
and Ellis, 2001), labor sorting (Moretti, 2013; Andersson et al., 2014), and
exposure to international trade (Rodr´ıguez-Pose, 2012).
Many times the question of interest is the impact of interpersonal in-
equality on the region’s rate of economic growth. To the extent that in-
equality may have a negative impact on economic growth, spatial variations
in interpersonal inequality may result in uneven regional growth. The evi-
dence on this relationship is mixed across studies. Partridge (1997) finds a
positive relationship between di↵erent measures of inequality and US state
income growth. Using a di↵erent methodological framework, but similar
data, Panizza (2002) finds no evidence of a positive relationship between
changes in inequality and changes in growth. While these two studies em-
ployed data at 10-year intervals, Frank (2009) develops an annual series of
state income inequality and finds a positive relationship between the top
decile share of income in a state, and the state’s economic growth. Addi-
tionally, the trends in inequality at the state level are found to mimic the
overall trend in aggregate US inequality.
2.2 Interregional Inequality
The second of Alonso’s five bells examined here concerns regional inequality.
While interpersonal inequality focuses on the inequalities between individ-
uals, interregional inequality is concerned with the inequalities between the
average incomes of regions within a national system. Relative to the num-
ber of studies of regional interpersonal income inequality reviewed above,
the literature on interregional income equality is considerably larger, dating
3As is well known, inequality in wealth distributions tends to be greater than income
inequality. However, data constraints prohibit an examination of wealth inequality below
the national scale in the US.
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back to early work by Myrdal (1957); Easterlin (1960); Williamson (1965).
This early work focused on the general empirical regularity that the level
of inequality between regions in a national economy tended to display an
inverted U pattern, increasing during early stages of national development
but then declining as the economy reached high levels of development.
Since this early work, the number of studies of regional interregional in-
equality has exploded, and an overview of this work is beyond the current
scope.4 Broadly speaking, studies of interregional inequality can be placed
into two groups based on the methodological approach adopted, those fo-
cusing on decompositions of regional inequality and those adopting a more
confirmatory approach that subsumes interregional inequality within the
question of regional income convergence.
The decomposition studies typically define a mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive partitioning of the individual economies into regions and then use
this regionalization to separate total inequality into two components: in-
terregional inequality and intraregional inequality. The former reflects the
inequality due to the di↵erences in the average group mean incomes, while
the latter measures inequality between economies assigned to the same re-
gion. Work on the US has demonstrated that within-region inequality tends
to be the larger of the two inequality components (Krugman, 1991; Fan and
Casetti, 1994; Rey, 2004). This echoes similar findings from studies of other
national systems (Shorrocks and Wan, 2005).
A slightly di↵erent perspective on interregional inequality can be seen in
the work using finer spatial scales to measure inequality, and relating that
to growth at the more aggregate level (Amos Jr., 1983, 1988; Janikas and
Rey, 2005, 2008). For example, rather than measure interpersonal income
inequality, interregional inequality between counties is used. Both sets of
studies report a great deal of heterogeneity in the inequality-growth nexus
across the states. Moreover, Janikas and Rey (2005) find that a very strong
positive relationship between spatial clustering in state income levels and
national economic growth in income takes on a di↵erent form at a lower
spatial scale where a generally negative relationship holds between intrastate
spatial clustering and state level income growth.
The second group of studies on interregional inequality is the vast liter-
ature on so called regional economic convergence (Rey and Le Gallo, 2009).
Alternative types of convergence have been examined in the literature, with
the most focus being on  - and  -convergence.  -convergence refers to a de-
cline in the dispersion in the cross-sectional distribution of regional incomes
4For an overview see Rey and Janikas (2005).
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over time.  -convergence is tied to neoclassical growth models suggesting
that the growth rate in a region’s income is a positive function of the dis-
tance from its steady-state. Empirical analysis of   convergence typically
specifies income growth rates as a function of initial incomes and variables
that condition for the steady state of each region.
For the US a number of studies have found general long-run evidence
for both   (Rey and Dev, 2006; Young et al., 2008) and   convergence
(Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1991; Bernard and Jones, 1996; Rey and Mon-
touri, 1999). However, some question if these long run trends are now being
reversed (Ganong and Shoag, 2015). Moreover, both   and   convergence
have been subjected to much criticism in the regional science literature for
their neglect of spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity - characteris-
tics of spatially referenced data that tend to be the norm rather than the
exception. These forms of convergence also provide only summary views of
the distribution of regional incomes and are generally silent on the internal
dynamics of the distribution (Rey and Le Gallo, 2009). These criticisms
have led to a related literature in spatial distribution dynamics where a new
set of exploratory methods have been suggested to study the full distribution
of regional incomes and the role of spatial e↵ects in their evolution (Rey,
2014).
2.3 Interpersonal and Interregional Inequality - Separated
at Birth?
While the literatures on social and regional inequality have matured since
Alonso’s paper, they have done so as largely separate endeavors with only
limited cross fertilization. Indeed, as Metwally and Jensen (1973) note,
measures of interregional inequality fail to take into account interpersonal
income inequality either nationally, or within regions. By the same token,
focusing on the aggregate national personal income distribution masks the
geographical dimensions of inequality dynamics.
There are good reasons for considering personal and regional income
inequality jointly. The work on interpersonal income inequality has used
measures of inequality defined on personal income distributions for each
state, and then focused on examining the determinants of these derived
measures. By contrast, the interregional inequality literature has used an
average income measure (typically per capita) for each region and explored
the distribution of these averages over space and time.
Consequently, the two literatures are studying di↵erent moments of the
same distribution. More specifically, let yj,r,t represent the income of indi-
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vidual j in region r in period t. The interpersonal inequality literature has
focused on measures related to the dispersion in the distribution of f(yi,r,t)
within a particular region:
 (y)2r,t =
1
Nr,t
X
j2r
(yj,r,t   y¯r,t)2 (1)
where y¯r,t =
1
Nr,t
P
j2r yj,r,t andNr,t is the population of r in time t. Analysis
of interpersonal inequality5 has focused on the distribution of  (y)2r,t over
r = 1, 2, . . . , R regions and t = 1, 2, . . . , T time periods, while the regional
inequality has examined the distribution of y¯r,t over the same regions and
time periods.
In addition to the linkage between the distribution that ties the two
literatures together, the second reason to consider both interpersonal and
regional inequality dynamics is that there could be gains achieved from
exploiting the complementary nature of the methodologies employed in the
two literatures. In the interpersonal inequality literature, the focus has
largely been on confirmatory modeling of the determinants of inequality or
the relationship between inequality and growth. Conversely, in the regional
inequality work, the emphasis has been on the underlying spatial patterns of
the level of incomes and the dynamics of those patterns. As the latter is more
exploratory in nature, while the former is confirmatory it seems prudent
to adopt the exploratory approach to the case of interpersonal inequality.
Essentially, the interpersonal inequality literature has simply skipped over
the exploratory phase, and in this paper I revisit this issue.
A third justification for focusing on both regional interpersonal and inter-
regional inequality is that together the two components represent a decom-
position of total national interpersonal income inequality (Rietveld, 1991).
This follows from the definition of the terms in (1), which can be extended
to measure the total inequality (variation) in the national system:
 (y)2t =
1
Nt
X
j
(yj,t   y¯t)2 (2)
where y¯t is the national mean of incomes in period t. The variance of national
personal incomes can then be decomposed into interregional and aggregate
intraregional components:
 (y)2t =  (y)
2
INTER,t +  (y)
2
INTRA,t (3)
5The specific measure of inequality and dispersion varies across the di↵erent studies,
the variance is used here to represent the general case.
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with
 (y)2INTER,t =
1
N
X
r
Nr(y¯r,t   y¯t)2 (4)
and
 (y)2INTRA,t =
1
N
X
r
X
j2r
(yj,r,t   y¯r,t)2. (5)
The recent focus on inequality in the US has been concerned with (2). On
the one hand, this has, to date, ignored the underlying components in (4) and
(5). Alonso’s two bells, on the other hand, do not consider the decomposition
between interregional and intraregional inequality explicitly. Rather, his
definition of interpersonal income inequality is (2), while by interregional
inequality Alonso pointed to (4). Aggregate intraregional variance is ignored
in his five bell system, but could be viewed as a derived decomposition:
 (y)2INTRA,t =  (y)
2
t    (y)2INTER,t (6)
In what follows, I explicitly consider both interregional and aggregate
intraregional variance together.
2.4 Bells in space
The bell analogy, while a powerful metaphor to help frame our thinking
about inequality dynamics, also brings to the fore an important issue re-
garding distributions. More specifically, one is often naturally drawn to
think of a bell as a stylized representation of a Gaussian distribution, and
in the case of questions about income inequality distributions are a central
concern. However, in the regional context, there are two problems with this
tendency. The first is that the bell as distribution metaphor is di↵erent from
what Alonso suggested as his view was that the bell traced out the path of
a scalar summary measure of some distribution over time. For per capita
income, that summary measure is the mean of the distribution for a set of
regions, with the distribution being measured at each point in time. For
personal income inequality the summary measure is something like a Gini
coe cient and the bell traces its evolution over time, but again the statistic
is derived from distributions of incomes measured at di↵erent points in time.
The second issue with the bell analogy is that the distributions under
consideration are explicitly univariate distributions. Without this, the scalar
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summary measures of those distributions lose their conceptual underpin-
nings. This perspective comes at a cost however, as univariate distributions
do not a↵ord a consideration of spatial dependence or spatial heterogeneity.
Spatial dependence becomes relevant whenever there is potential for the re-
gions to interact, which would be reflected in migration, capital flows, trade
and other phenomena that tie regions together.
Spatial heterogeneity would be reflected in situations where di↵erent
subsets of the regions in the system display di↵erent types of behaviors,
such as in the case of convergence clubs (Chatterji and Dewhurst, 1996)
or poverty traps (Bowles et al., 2008), which may be driven by variations
in economic structure (i.e., industry mix, demographic composition), across
regional economies. The presence of either spatial dependence or spatial
heterogeneity requires a shift in thinking from a univariate to a multivariate
perspective since the latter a↵ords the formal representation of these spatial
e↵ects.
Here we see another asymmetry in the two inequality literatures. The
regional convergence literature has embraced the spatial dimensions in em-
pirical, and to a lesser extent, theoretical, work. By contrast, the work
on intraregional interpersonal income inequality has treated the observa-
tions from each of the regions as independent from those in other regions.
The determinants of interpersonal income inequality within a state have
been viewed as originating within that state - spatial interactions have been
largely ignored. Given that there is growing evidence that the adoption of
spatial methods, be they spatial econometrics or exploratory spatial data
analysis, has provided important insights in the regional convergence litera-
ture, it seems worthwhile to extend these methods to the spatial dynamics
of interpersonal regional income inequality as well.
3 Methods
The joint consideration of interpersonal regional income inequality and in-
terregional income inequality requires the development of times series of
observations on both types of inequality for each region within a national
system. The two series are then analyzed via the same set of space-time
analytics.
3.1 Data
The data used to measure state level interpersonal income inequality comes
from a unique series constructed by Frank (2009). It is based on pretax
10
adjusted gross income reported by the United States Internal Revenue Ser-
vice which includes wages and salaries, capital income, and entrepreneurial
income. The particular series examined in this paper are the income shares
of the top percentile (S01) and top decile (S10) of the population annually
for the period 1916-2012.
In addition to the income shares, data on per capita income for the states
is obtained from the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis6 covering the period 1929-2012. State per capita incomes (SPI)
are normalized relative to the national mean (USPI) for each year in the
sample: RSPIr,t =
SPIr,t
USPIt
.7
3.2 Methods: Distributional Dynamics
The central focus in this paper is an examination of the distributional dy-
namics of interpersonal and regional income inequality in the US over the
period. More specifically, the internal distributional dynamics which reflect
the extent of mobility of the states within the respective distributions over
time are a key concern. Both the summary measures of mobility and the
role of spatial structure and interactions are considered.
3.2.1 Discrete Markov Chains
The departure point for investigating inequality dynamics is the estimation
of discrete Markov chains (DMC). These are formed for regional series at two
points in time: y 2 [0,1) and yt+d 2 [0,1) with cummulative distribution
function F (yt, yt+d). The DMC maps F (yt, yt+d) into a k ⇥ k transition
matrix, where k is the number of discrete space states the chain can be
in at any moment in time. States of the chain are defined as: 0  c1,t 
c2,t  . . .  ck,t. The transition probability matrix for the DMC takes the
following form:
pi,j =
Pr(ci 1,t < yr,t  ci,t \ cj 1,t+d < yr,t+d  cj,t+d)
Pr(ci 1,t < yr,t  ci,t) (7)
6US Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Annual state personal income and employment,
all tables and areas”, http://www.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm (accessed May 14,
2014).
7The results that follow are conditioned upon the choice of the state as the unit of
analysis. This is driven by the availability of the long time series at this spatial scale.
Finer spatial scales, such as counties, would limit the temporal frequency to decades.
Sensitivity of the results to changes in spatial scale and temporal frequency remain for
future research.
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where yr,t is the observed value of the series for region r in period t. Thus,
(7) gives the conditional probability that a region r in class i in period t
moves into class j in period t+ d.8
One assumption generally made in the literature is that these probabil-
ities hold for all R regions and time periods. This allows for the estima-
tion of P using paired samples of (yr,t, yr,t+d) 8r = 1, 2, . . . , R drawn from
F (yt, yt+d) using maximum likelihood:
pˆi,j =
PR
r=1 I(ci 1,t < yr,t  ci,t \ cj 1,t+d < yr,t+d  cj,t+d)PR
r=1 I(ci 1,t < yr,t  ci,t)
(8)
and
⇡ˆi,t =
1
n
RX
r=1
I(ci 1,t < yr,t  ci,t) (9)
where I(.) is an indicator function with value 1 if the condition is true and
0 otherwise, and ⇡ˆi,t is the marginal probability of a region being in discrete
state i of the distribution in time t.9
The discrete Markov chain framework can be used to examine a number
of dimensions of regional inequality distribution dynamics. These include
di↵erent measures of the mobility in the distribution reflecting specific types
of movement within the distribution. Additionally, comparison of the dy-
namics across regional inequality series or at di↵erent points in time allows
for an examination of alternative forms of heterogeneity in the dynamics.
The question of whether the series can be viewed as a single Markov
chain, or M separate chains is addressed through a test of homogeneity of
the Markov transition probability matrices. Following Bickenbach and Bode
(2003) I adopt two formal tests of homogeneity:
Q(M) =
MX
m=1
nX
i=1
X
j2Ai
ni|m
(pˆi,j|m   pˆi,j)2
pˆi,j
(10)
Ho : pi,j|m = pi,j 8m = 1, 2, . . . ,M
8I am re-purposing subscripts here to index discrete states of the chain, rather than
individual regional economies.
9Space limitations prevent a more detailed treatment of the DMC and related method-
ological issues. For more details see Rey (2015).
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Q(M) ⇠  2
 
NX
i=1
(ai   1)(bi   1)
!
where ai is the number of elements in Ai which is the set of nonzero transition
probabilities in the ith row of the transition matrix estimated from the entire
sample, and bi is the number of the regimes for which a positive number of
observations is available for the ith row (Bi = {m : ni|m > 0}).
The Likelihood ratio test for the same null takes the following form:
LR(M) = 2
MX
m=1
nX
i=1
X
j2Ai|j
ni,j|mln
pˆi,j|m
pˆi,j
(11)
where Ai|m = {j : pˆi,j|m > 0} is the set of nonzero transition probabilities in
the ith row of the transition matrix estimated from the mth regime. LR(M)
has the same asymptotic distribution as Q(M).
The homogeneity testing framework is quite general and permits the
examination of a number of interesting special cases reflecting alternative
definitions of the regimes. For example, if di↵erent variables can be used to
measure inequality, a test of the similarity of the dynamics of the inequality
reflected in the two series can be considered using this framework. In the
current context, we can compare intraregional interpersonal inequality and
its dynamics over space to that of interregional income inequality dynamics.
3.2.2 Spatial Autocorrelation
To complement the focus on distributional dynamics, a spatial perspective is
also adopted to explore the nature and extent of any spatial clustering in the
two inequality series. For each year and series, both global measures of spa-
tial autocorrelation and local indicators of spatial association are calculated.
The global measure is Moran’s I:
It =
n
S0
P
r
P
s zr,twr,szs,tP
r z
2
r,t
(12)
where wi,j is the value from a row-standardized, queen-based contiguity
matrix for the 48 conterminous US states, S0 is the sum of all the elements
in W , and zr,t = yr,t   y¯t. The global measure at time t can be used to test
if the inequality series departs from a random spatial process.
The local indicators of spatial association are:
13
Ir,t =
n
S0
P
s zr,twr,szs,tP
r z
2
r,t
(13)
which provide for an exploration of localized spatial clustering which might
be driving the global pattern from (12) or departing from the global process
(Anselin, 1995).
3.2.3 Space-Time Measures
To examine the role of space in shaping the distributional dynamics, a num-
ber of spatial extensions to the DMC are also employed. The spatial Markov
chain (Rey, 2001) conditions the transition probabilities facing a regional
series on its regional context. This is a specific form of the general homo-
geneity framework above, where the regimes are defined based on the spatial
lag of the inequality series. More specifically, the spatial lag is defined as
Lr,t =
P
swr,sys,t and is itself discretized into quintiles. A formal test of
whether the transitional dynamics are homogeneous across the regimes based
on the spatial lag quintiles is then carried out.
4 Results
4.1 Dynamics of Inequality
Figure 1 contains the time series for the mean income shares claimed by the
richest 0.10 (S10) and 0.01 (S01) of individuals, with the means taken over
the states. The two shares move in concert and reflect the general U-pattern
reported by Piketty and Saez (2006) where high levels of inequality mark
the beginning of the sample followed by a long period of declining inequality
from the early peak in 1930 through to 1980. This decline sharply reversed
in the 1980’s returning levels of inequality to their historical highs.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 2 reports the maximum of the income shares for S01 and S10. In
the most extreme case, Florida’s 0.10 income share reached almost 0.80 of
total personal income in 1929, with its 0.01 share claiming an astounding
0.60 of total personal income for the state. While the maximum shares
display the initial decline from the peaks that were seen in the average
shares, the growth in the maximum shares after 1980 is not as pronounced
as the increase in the mean inequality seen in Figure 1.
[Figure 2 about here.]
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Figure 3 displays the evolution of the global quintile distribution over
time.10 The number of states with 0.01 income shares falling into each
quintile fluctuates in interesting patterns. Generally speaking, three di↵er-
ent epochs where the quintile distribution takes on di↵erent forms can be
identified. In the early part of the sample up to 1940 the upper quintiles
dominate reflecting a period of high personal income inequality. In the sec-
ond epoch, 1940-80, the first and second quintiles grow in importance at the
expense of the fifth quintile, which starting in 1966 up until 1988 contained
no states. The final epoch starts in 1988 with the resurgence of the fifth
quintile and its clear dominance. Indeed, for the years 2004-2008 all states
have 0.01 shares in the fifth global quintile.
[Figure 3 about here.]
If the income share quintile distribution is compared to the global quintile
distribution for relative per capita income of the states in Figure 4 clear
distinctions between these two series emerge. For relative incomes, there
is a general pattern of convergence as the first and fifth quintiles begin
the sample period as dominant but loose states over time. The internal
quintiles (Q2, Q3, Q4) gain states together throughout most of the period
with a shift towards the end of the sample where the middle quintile begins
to shrink, while the second and fourth continue to expand. There is also
a renewal of growth for the first and fifth quintile towards the very end
of the sample. Unlike the case for the income share quintile distribution,
there are no clear epochs in the evolution of the per capita income quintile
distribution. Moreover, the each of the five quintiles in the share distribution
experiences periods where there are no states falling in that quintile, while
for the per capita quintile distribution none of the global quintiles is ever
empty.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4.2 Spatial Distribution of Inequality
Figure 5 displays the global quintile maps for the 0.01 share of incomes for
the 48 lower US states in selected years. Since they are derived from a pool-
ing of all annual series, the quintiles are fixed for each of the maps in order
to more readily visualize the evolution of the spatial patterns. Examination
10Global quintiles which are defined for the pooled annual series: Q(V EC(Y )) where Y
is an R⇥ T matrix. Local quintiles are defined for each year, or column of Y : Q(Y.,t).
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of the global quintiles reveals that the maximum share of the top 0.01 of
households was 0.608 over the sample period with a minimum of 0.062. To
enter the fifth quintile required that the 0.01 share exceed 0.151 in a given
year. The evolution of the map patterns reveals the spatial footprint of the
summary inequality dynamics behind Figures 1-3.
While the general U pattern of interpersonal income inequality in the
US has been much commented upon, the spatial distribution of inequality
and the evolution of these patterns suggests that even when the overall
level of inequality are roughly equal, as in the first and third epochs in the
time series in Figure 1, the spatial distribution associated with these high-
inequality periods can be distinct. In the modern high-inequality era the
spatial homogenization of inequality is much stronger than in the earlier high
inequality era of the 1920s. In the third epoch the increase in inequality was
associated with a rapid change in its spatial distribution between 1988, where
states are in either the first or second quintiles, and 1997 where all states
move to the fourth or fifth quintiles. As was seen in the time series plots of
the summary income shares, this period reflected rapid increase in inequality
and this is clearly reflected in its spatial distribution, as by 2005 each state’s
0.10 income share is in the upper quintile. By contrast, the spatial patterns
of inequality in the 1920 period are much more heterogeneous.
The time series of maps for state relative per capita incomes by global
quintile for the same select years are shown in Figure 6. In contrast to
the maps of 0.01 income shares, the state per capita income maps display
considerably less di↵erentiation across the three epochs. The general trend
is a reduction in dispersion in relative per capita incomes reflected in states
moving out of the first and fifth quintiles over time, as was suggested by
Figure 4. However, there is a clear spatial signature to these changes as the
cluster of low income southeastern states in the early epoch breaks apart
beginning with the second epoch.
The maps provide a rich depiction of the changing structure of personal
and spatial income inequality in the US At the same time, this depiction is
a challenge to summarize from a visual perspective. In order to address this
challenge we can turn to a series of formal analytics to provide more specific
insights into these complex dynamics.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
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4.3 Homogeneous Inequality Dynamics?
The first set of tests explore the question of whether the di↵erent regional
series display distinct transitional dynamics over the study period.11
Beginning with the local quintile distributions, Table 1 reports the test
of homogeneity in the Markov transition probability matrices between the
0.01 percentile and 0.10 percentile income shares. The test is based on the
quintile distribution of the state inequality shares, as measured by the 0.01
share or the 0.10 share. The transition matrix under the null P (H0) is es-
timated by pooling the two series as a single chain, while the bottom two
tables report the marginal transition probability matrices estimated for each
share series separately. Both the likelihood ratio and  2 tests are marginally
significant (p = 0.10) and an examination of the diagonal elements of the
two marginal tables reveals that the state 0.01 percentile distribution dis-
plays relatively greater mobility relative to the distribution based on the
0.10 shares. Given that the 0.01 and 0.10 share series are correlated by
construction, in what follows I focus on only the 0.01 shares in comparisons
with measures of regional inequality dynamics.
[Table 1 about here.]
The question of whether the dynamics of interpersonal and regional in-
equality are distinct is next examined in Table 2 where the estimated Markov
transition matrices for the global quintile series for the S01 and relative per
capita income series RSPI are tested for homogeneity. Both the likelihood
ratio and Q tests of homogeneity are significant.12 Moreover, the mobility
in the S01 series is substantially greater than that in the per capita income
series as reflected in the larger diagonal values in the table for the second
series.
[Table 2 about here.]
4.4 Spatial Mobility Dynamics
4.4.1 Global and Local Spatial Autocorrelation
Figure 7 portrays the time series for the z-values of Moran’s I global measure
of spatial autocorrelation for the per capita income and one-percent income
11All computations are based on PySAL (Rey and Anselin, 2010).
12The same time period is used in comparing the dynamics of S01 and RSPI, 1929-2012,
while in Table 1 the longer time series is used for S01 and S10, 1916-2012.
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shares over the period. Relative to the critical value of 1.96 (dotted hori-
zontal line), there are clear di↵erences between the two series with regard to
the presence of spatial dependence. For the per capita series, spatial depen-
dence is found each year in the sample, displaying a drop from its strongest
levels earlier in the series until 1980 at which point the dependence reaches
its lowest level. However, even at this minimum the dependence is still sig-
nificant and following 1980 there is an increase in the strength of spatial
dependence. By contrast, the global measure for the one percent income
share is never significant during the period 1929-2012. In other words, from
a whole-map or global perspective, state interpersonal income inequality is
randomly distributed in space.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Turning to the local measures, Figure 8 displays the time series of counts
for the number of significant local statistics for each series. Now there is ev-
idence of local clustering despite the finding of no global spatial autocorre-
lation for S01. At the same time, there is a greater extent of local clustering
for RSPI than for S01, reflecting similar finding for the global case. For
RSPI, the pattern for the evolution of the number of significant LISAs is
roughly in-line with the pattern of the global measure.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Table 3 decomposes the total counts from Figure 8 by state and which
quadrant of the Moran Scatter Plot the significant local statistic falls in.
For the RSPI series, there are two dominant groups of states, those falling
in the High-High (HH) quadrant in the majority of years (562 instances)
including the northeastern states (CT, DE, MA, NJ, NY, PA, RI), and
those comprising the Low-Low (LL) group (675 instances) which includes
the southern states (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX). Less
common are the spatial outliers - local statistics falling into either the Low-
High (LH) or High-Low (HL) quadrants.
The pattern for the decomposition of the LISA counts for the one percent
shares is less defined than for the RSPI series. Only three states have at least
10 LISAs in the HH quadrant - reflecting spatial hot spots of interpersonal
inequality, while only two states, FL and DE, fall in the LL quadrant in 10 or
more years, in this case forming cold spots of income inequality. Moreover,
the largest number of LISAs fall in the LH quadrant for the S01 series (140
instances), followed by the HL quadrant (70 instances). In other words,
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the S01 and RSPI series are distinguished by the former have more local
outliers, while the latter having more clusters (hot and cold-spots).
[Table 3 about here.]
4.4.2 Spatial Markov
The results of the spatial Markov tests are reported in Tables 4 and 5 for the
S01 and RSPI series, respectively. Recall that the test examines whether
the transitional probabilities for the chain are influenced by the level of
the spatial lag for the chain at the beginning of the transition period. For
both series, the spatial independence assumption is rejected meaning that
local context can shape the movement of the chain in the distribution. For
example, on average states in the poorest quintile at the beginning of a
period have an estimated probability of 0.924 of remaining in that quintile
at the end of the year. However, when focusing on states in the first quintile
surrounded by neighboring states also in the first quintile, that probability
increases to 0.972 percent, while if the neighbors are in the fifth quintile the
probability drops to 0.600 (Table 5).
For the income shares, on average, states with the highest levels of inter-
personal inequality have a 0.858 probability of remaining in the fifth quintile
if they began a year in that quintile. However, if a state in the fifth quin-
tile of interpersonal income inequality is surrounded by states that are on
average also in that quintile the probability increases to 0.875 (Table 4).
In contrast to the cross-sectional setting where spatial dependence in the
income shares was found to be weak or non-existent in most years, the dy-
namics of state personal income inequality are sensitive to spatial context
as the assumption of one transition matrix applying across all observations
is rejected.
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Using the US states over the period 1929-2012, this paper has examined two
of Alonso’s five bells with a particular focus on their space-time co-evolution.
Application of exploratory space-time analytics reveals that the patterns of
social, or interpersonal, and regional, or interregional, inequality are complex
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and display characteristics that were not considered in Alonso’s original
stylized model. Interpersonal inequality displayed a U-pattern resulting in
levels of inequality at the end of the period actually exceeding the alarmingly
high values found in the 1920’s. By contrast, interregional income inequality
between the US states has displayed a general decline up until the end of
this period where convergence has slowed or even reversed.
In addition to the di↵erences in the overall trends for the two types of
inequality, their distributional dynamics are also found to be distinct with
social inequality exhibiting greater mobility than interregional inequality,
meaning that states move across the quintiles of the social inequality distri-
bution more frequently than they do in the per capita income distribution.
The spatial patterns of these movements are also di↵erentiated as per
capita incomes are strongly spatially autocorrelated each year in the sample,
while global spatial dependence is never found for social inequality. A local
analysis, however, reveals evidence of pockets of hot and cold spots for inter-
regional inequality, as well as spatial outliers for social inequality. Finally,
spatial Markov tests reveal that the transitional dynamics for both series are
not independent of the local context for a state economy as the estimated
transition probability matrices for both social and interregional income in-
equality are found to be significantly di↵erent across regimes defined on the
spatial lag of each series.
Alongside the distinct spatial patterns of interregional and interpersonal
inequality are pronounced temporal di↵erences in the spatial distribution
of interpersonal inequality. The two periods of high interpersonal inequal-
ity, the 1920’s and the post 1980 era, have substantially di↵erent spatial
distributions with the latter distribution characterized by a spatial homog-
enization of high personal income inequality, while in the former period
high interpersonal income inequality is more spatially concentrated along
the northeastern and western states.
This homogenization of interpersonal income inequality has also coin-
cided with a reversal of a long running trend towards regional income con-
vergence. The causes of this reversal and its association with increasing
interpersonal income inequality are poorly understood. Fan and Casetti
(1994) argue that the Rustbelt-Sunbelt shift dominated the US economic
landscape up until the late 1960s and was a major force in driving regional
income convergence. Subsequently, sectoral shifts reflected in the loss of
manufacturing jobs and their replacement with lower paying service resulted
in a hollowing out of the personal income distribution. They suggest that
the spatial impact of this restructuring may have been uneven with new
service and financial sector growth being more prevalent in the traditional
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core.
In addition to deindustrialization, fiscal policies and political decentral-
ization associated with the Reagan administration have been suggested as
possible causes for increasing interregional inequality. Coughlin and Man-
delbaum (1988) found that defense expenditures during the Reagan admin-
istration were spatially biased towards high income states and away from
low income states, increasing interstate inequality.
The decentralization associated with Reagan’s New Federalism gave in-
dividual states more freedom to shape economic development policies. De-
centralization could have led to greater spatial inequalities through a va-
riety of mechanisms such as lost economies of scale in addressing concen-
trated poverty and di↵erences in institutional capacities and resources across
regions, although the relationship between decentralization and spatial in-
equality may vary depending on the level of development of a nation (Rodr´ıguez-
Pose and Ezcurra, 2010).
At the same time, the trend towards spatially ubiquitous levels of high
personal income inequality uncovered in the latter period of this study may
suggest that policies at the national level, such as tax reforms (Stiglitz,
2014), and macroeconomic events, including the great recession, financial
meltdown and housing market implosion, have had global e↵ects resulting
in greater inequality due to declining real incomes at the bottom and middle
of the income distribution and the rise of private debt in the form of loans
leveraging ephemeral house price increases (Essletzbichler, 2015; Galbraith,
2012).
Although the housing market bubble appeared to have global impacts in
terms of increasing interpersonal income inequality, there is some evidence
to suggest that it may have also slowed regional convergence. Ganong and
Shoag (2015) argue that high housing costs in high income regions worked to
dampen migration of low wage workers from poor to richer regions due to the
price sensitivity of low income workers. This reduced the labor and human
capital reallocation process that historically had been an engine of regional
convergence in the US. In short, the returns to residing in productive regions
net of housing costs have moved in opposite directions attracting skilled
works but diverting in-migration of unskilled workers. The housing bubble
and housing regulations are the argued causes of these house price changes.
The joint consideration of interpersonal inequality and interregional in-
equality reveals insights that could have implications for regional economic
development polices. The greater mobility in interpersonal inequality, rela-
tive to average state incomes, suggests that polices may have more impact
on reducing (or increasing) inequality within states than they do on relative
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state income growth. At the same time, the strong evidence of spatial depen-
dence in the dynamics of both inequality series implies that states should not
be considered independent actors as policies adopted by one state may have
spillover impacts into neighboring states. Taking these policy spillovers into
account would argue for a national or regional perspective on state economic
development policies.
Application of exploratory space-time methods is a first step towards the
call for the “simultaneous consideration” (Alonso, 1980, p 5) of interpersonal
and interregional income inequality dynamics, and a more complete under-
standing of the dynamics of di↵erent types of inequality and their interde-
pendencies. The empirical patterns uncovered here need to be considered
from the lenses of existing regional inequality theory and personal income
inequality theory with an eye towards their integration. Additionally, from
a methodological point of view, the role of spatial context in the dynamics
of both social and regional inequality need to be taken into account in future
econometric work.
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Markov Homogeneity Test
Number of classes: 5
Number of transitions: 9216
Number of regimes: 2
Regime names: S01, S10
Test LR Q
Stat. 28.629 28.449
DOF 20 20
p-value 0.095 0.099
P(H0) Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q0 0.809 0.155 0.026 0.006 0.004
Q1 0.172 0.552 0.237 0.031 0.008
Q2 0.025 0.210 0.548 0.190 0.027
Q3 0.010 0.036 0.212 0.582 0.159
Q4 0.001 0.006 0.022 0.152 0.819
P(S01) Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q0 0.790 0.176 0.026 0.004 0.004
Q1 0.192 0.547 0.227 0.027 0.007
Q2 0.027 0.198 0.558 0.191 0.026
Q3 0.010 0.034 0.216 0.567 0.172
Q4 0.001 0.003 0.017 0.171 0.808
P(S10) Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q0 0.829 0.133 0.026 0.008 0.003
Q1 0.153 0.557 0.248 0.035 0.008
Q2 0.023 0.222 0.537 0.190 0.028
Q3 0.010 0.039 0.207 0.597 0.146
Q4 0.001 0.008 0.027 0.133 0.830
Table 1: Markov homogeneity tests, 0.01 percentile and 0.10 percentile shares, US state
incomes
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Markov Homogeneity Test
Number of classes: 5
Number of transitions: 7968
Number of regimes: 2
Regime names: GQS01, GQRSPI
Test LR Q
Stat. 252.133 243.255
DOF 17 17
p-value 0.000 0.000
P(H0) Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q0 0.866 0.127 0.006 0.001 0.000
Q1 0.121 0.745 0.128 0.005 0.001
Q2 0.006 0.128 0.727 0.138 0.002
Q3 0.001 0.005 0.134 0.759 0.102
Q4 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.100 0.898
P(GQS01) Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q0 0.809 0.186 0.005 0.000 0.000
Q1 0.182 0.656 0.160 0.001 0.000
Q2 0.005 0.154 0.675 0.165 0.001
Q3 0.001 0.003 0.151 0.693 0.151
Q4 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.140 0.858
P(GQRSPI) Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q0 0.924 0.068 0.008 0.001 0.000
Q1 0.059 0.835 0.096 0.009 0.001
Q2 0.006 0.102 0.779 0.110 0.003
Q3 0.000 0.008 0.116 0.825 0.052
Q4 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.061 0.937
Table 2: Markov homogeneity tests, 0.01 percentile shares and per capita incomes, global
quintiles, US state incomes
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RSPI S01
State NS HH LH LL HL NS HH LH LL HL
AL 24 0 0 60 0 84 0 0 0 0
AZ 76 3 5 0 0 78 0 0 6 0
AR 4 0 0 80 0 83 1 0 0 0
CA 75 9 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
CO 76 0 0 0 8 81 0 0 3 0
CT 16 68 0 0 0 64 1 19 0 0
DE 19 65 0 0 0 73 0 0 11 0
FL 48 0 0 31 5 63 0 0 13 8
GA 22 0 0 62 0 83 0 0 1 0
ID 69 3 12 0 0 79 0 0 0 5
IL 84 0 0 0 0 54 24 6 0 0
IN 84 0 0 0 0 76 0 0 1 7
IA 84 0 0 0 0 51 0 33 0 0
KS 84 0 0 0 0 75 0 0 1 8
KY 84 0 0 0 0 75 0 9 0 0
LA 1 0 0 83 0 84 0 0 0 0
ME 84 0 0 0 0 71 1 12 0 0
MD 84 0 0 0 0 71 0 0 3 10
MA 22 62 0 0 0 49 14 21 0 0
MI 84 0 0 0 0 43 5 36 0 0
MN 81 0 0 3 0 73 6 1 0 4
MS 0 0 0 84 0 80 0 0 0 4
MO 72 0 0 9 3 77 0 0 1 6
MT 78 0 0 6 0 84 0 0 0 0
NE 84 0 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
NV 82 1 0 1 0 84 0 0 0 0
NH 84 0 0 0 0 82 2 0 0 0
NJ 24 60 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
NM 84 0 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
NY 9 75 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
NC 45 0 0 39 0 83 0 0 1 0
ND 84 0 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
OH 76 0 0 8 0 82 0 0 1 1
OK 80 0 0 4 0 84 0 0 0 0
OR 39 45 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
PA 10 74 0 0 0 80 0 0 4 0
RI 4 77 3 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
SC 60 0 0 24 0 79 0 0 5 0
SD 82 2 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
TN 0 0 0 84 0 84 0 0 0 0
TX 6 0 0 73 5 69 0 3 0 12
UT 84 0 0 0 0 83 0 0 1 0
VT 33 17 34 0 0 70 14 0 0 0
VA 57 0 0 22 5 82 0 0 0 2
WA 84 0 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
WV 84 0 0 0 0 83 0 0 1 0
WI 83 1 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 0
WY 82 0 0 2 0 81 0 0 0 3
Total 2715 562 54 675 26 3701 68 140 53 70
Table 3: Local Autocorrelation Statistics by Moran Scatter Plot Quadrant, S01 and RSPI.
NS: Not significant; HH: High (own), High (neighbor); LH: Low (own), High (neighbor);
LL: Low (own), Low (neighbor); HL: High (own), Low (neighbor).
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Spatial Markov Test S01
Number of classes: 5
Number of transitions: 3984
Number of regimes: 5
Regime names: LAG0, LAG1, LAG2, LAG3, LAG4
Test LR Q
Stat. 194.130 339.776
DOF 60 60
p-value 0.000 0.000
P(H0) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.809 0.186 0.005 0.000 0.000
C1 0.182 0.656 0.160 0.001 0.000
C2 0.005 0.154 0.675 0.165 0.001
C3 0.001 0.003 0.151 0.693 0.151
C4 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.140 0.858
P(LAG0) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.816 0.179 0.004 0.000 0.000
C1 0.211 0.729 0.061 0.000 0.000
C2 0.000 0.262 0.714 0.024 0.000
C3 0.167 0.000 0.167 0.500 0.167
C4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.800
P(LAG1) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.833 0.162 0.004 0.000 0.000
C1 0.178 0.639 0.184 0.000 0.000
C2 0.016 0.207 0.717 0.060 0.000
C3 0.000 0.020 0.255 0.667 0.059
C4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.136 0.864
P(LAG2) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.646 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.000
C1 0.126 0.615 0.259 0.000 0.000
C2 0.000 0.125 0.667 0.208 0.000
C3 0.000 0.000 0.215 0.718 0.068
C4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.304 0.696
P(LAG3) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.857 0.114 0.029 0.000 0.000
C1 0.204 0.537 0.241 0.019 0.000
C2 0.006 0.110 0.686 0.198 0.000
C3 0.000 0.000 0.139 0.711 0.150
C4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.153 0.847
P(LAG4) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.800 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000
C1 0.250 0.375 0.375 0.000 0.000
C2 0.000 0.273 0.424 0.273 0.030
C3 0.000 0.005 0.087 0.647 0.261
C4 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.121 0.875
Table 4: Spatial Markov Test, S01, k=5
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Spatial Markov Test RSPI
Number of classes: 5
Number of transitions: 3984
Number of regimes: 5
Regime names: LAG0, LAG1, LAG2, LAG3, LAG4
Test LR Q
Stat. 173.190 195.109
DOF 64 64
p-value 0.000 0.000
P(H0) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.924 0.068 0.008 0.001 0.000
C1 0.059 0.835 0.096 0.009 0.001
C2 0.006 0.102 0.779 0.110 0.003
C3 0.000 0.008 0.116 0.825 0.052
C4 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.061 0.937
P(LAG0) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.972 0.026 0.002 0.000 0.000
C1 0.051 0.803 0.139 0.007 0.000
C2 0.009 0.151 0.717 0.123 0.000
C3 0.000 0.024 0.262 0.619 0.095
C4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.286 0.714
P(LAG1) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.777 0.182 0.033 0.008 0.000
C1 0.074 0.860 0.062 0.004 0.000
C2 0.000 0.103 0.806 0.091 0.000
C3 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.892 0.036
C4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.805
P(LAG2) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.844 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000
C1 0.063 0.844 0.076 0.013 0.004
C2 0.016 0.089 0.801 0.089 0.005
C3 0.000 0.006 0.091 0.835 0.068
C4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.132 0.868
P(LAG3) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.948 0.039 0.013 0.000 0.000
C1 0.045 0.836 0.109 0.009 0.000
C2 0.000 0.073 0.794 0.129 0.004
C3 0.000 0.018 0.189 0.732 0.061
C4 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.071 0.924
P(LAG4) C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
C0 0.600 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000
C1 0.030 0.773 0.182 0.015 0.000
C2 0.010 0.136 0.728 0.126 0.000
C3 0.000 0.005 0.094 0.865 0.036
C4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.977
Table 5: Spatial Markov Test, RSPI, k=5
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